In this paper, a new class of zero knowledge interactive proofs, a divertible zero knowl- proof. We also show that a specific class of the commutative random self-reducible problems have more pracfical divertible perfect zero knowledge interactive proofs. This clans of zero knowledge interactive proofs has two sides; one positive, the other negative. On the positive side, divertible zero knowledge interactive proofs can be used to protect privacy in networked and computerized environments. Electronic checking and secret electronic balloting are described in this paper to illustrate this side. On the negative side, identification systems based on these zero knowledge interactive proofs are vulnerable to an abuse, which is, however, for the most part common to all logical idenification schemes.
Introduction
In this paper, we consider the following question: Let ( A , B ) be a zero knowledge interactive proof (ZKIP) system regarding a problem, where A is a prover and B is a verifier. Can B prove this problem to another machine C in a zero knowledge manner under the condition that B does not leave any evidence of his utilizing A's power in order to prove it to C? In other words, this condition can be described as follows: B does not leave any evidence of the relationship between the A-B interactions and the B-C interactions. In many applications of this class of zero knowledge interactive proofs, this condition plays an essential role.
First, a new class of zero knowledge interactive prooh is defined, diveriible zero knowledge interactive proofs, which satisfies the above-mentioned question. A new class of problems, c o r n m u f a i i v e r a n d o m self-reducible (CRSR) problems, are also defined. Basically, these are a variant of the r a n d o m self-reducible problems introduced by Angluin et al., [AL] and Tompa et al., [TW] . We show that any CRSR problem has a divertible perfect zero knowledge interactive proof. We also show that a specific class of CRSR problems, e n d o m o r p h i c CRSR (ECRSR) problems, have m o r e praciical (multi-keys a n d higher degree version) divertible perfect zero knowledge interactive proofs.
Divertible zero knowledge interactive proofs have two sides; one positive, the other negative. On the positive side, this class of zero knowledge interactive proofs can be used to protect privacy in networked and computerized situations. For example, a blind digital signature scheme based on divertible zero knowledge interactive proofs can be constructed. The blind digital signature schemes based on the RSA scheme and the GMR scheme [GoMiRi] have been proposed for electronic check protocols and electronic secret ballot protocols [Cl, C2, Oh2, Da] . However, the scheme based on the RSA is not provably secure against adaptive chosen message attacks and is not efficient. The scheme based on the GMR is provably secure against adaptive chosen message attacks under some reasonable assumptions but is not efficient. In contrast(, our scheme, based on divertible zero knowledge interactive proofs, is provably secure against adaptive chosen message attacks under some assumptions [MS, S] and is efficient when some efficient problems (e.g., square root modN) are used. In this paper, we show two applications of divertible zero knowledge interactive proofs: one for electronic checking, and the other for secret electronic balloting. As a different type of application, this class of zero-knowledge proofs can be used to construct subliminal-channel-free identification/signature systems based on zereknowledge proofs in a manner similar to that shown by Desmedt et al., [DGB, De] .
On the negative side, we show a new abuse of divertible zero knowledge interactive proofs, which is related to the m a f i a f r a u d described in [DGB] . These abuses, however, are for the most part common to all logical identification schemes, in which security depends only on secret information. In our abuse, Bob can pass himself off a. s Alice to anyone, when Alice proves her identity to Bob, and he conceals any evidence regarding the relationship between Bob's proof and Alice's proof. That is, although Bob proves himself to be Alice with Alice's help, he conceals any evidence that he used her help. To illuminate this situation, we discuss a number of measures for overcoming these abuses.
Note:
The protocol described in [DGB] as a subliminal-channel-free identification system b a e d on the Fiat-Shamir scheme satisfies the property gf divertible zero knowledge inter-active proofs. That is, although the notion of divertible zero-knowledge interactive proofs has not been proposed previously, an implementation of this class of zero knowledge interactive proofs based on the Fiat-Shamir scheme has been shown in [DGB] , where this protocol corresponds to a protbcol to be shown in Appendix B.
Divertible z e r o knowledge interactive proofs
There are two types of interactive proofs. One is an interactive proof JOT membership in language L , in which a membership of an instance in language L is demonstrated [GMR] . The other is an intcractive proof /or posscssiun o j z7ijurnrct~ia7~, in which a provcr's possession of information is demonstrated [FFS, TW] . In this paper, we concentrate on the interactive proof for possession of information, The results in this paper can be applied to the interactive proof for language membership.
( A , B ) is an interactive pair of Turing machines, where A is the prover, and B is the verifier [GMR, TM] 
-are (polynomially indistinguishablefivalent), where A is a valid prover.
3. C o m m u t a t i v e random self-reducible problems and divertible p e r f e c t z e r o knowledge i n t e r a c t i v e proofs 
R2.
There is a polynomial time algorithm that, given N , x , r, and any y' E R N ( z ' ) , outputs R3. There is a polynomial time algorithm that, given N , I , r , and any y E R,(z), outputs some y' E RN(z'). If, in addition, T is randomly and uniformly chosen on R,v(XN),
and ( R Y ( X N ) , * )
is a commutative group. In addition, the following relation holds.
over dOmRN.
R5. There is a polynomial time algorithm that, given N , z , and x', outputs some Z * E dornRN such that (x*, r-') E R N .
In the conditions €or CRSR in Definition 2, R.l-R,3 are tlic smie as lliose lor i a m f o m self-reducible (RSR) shown in [TW] , but R4 and R5 are added. In CRSR, T E R N ( X N )
replaces T E ( 0 , l ) " from RSR. Therefore, the set of CRSR relations is a subset of RSR relations.
(1) Laws of composition * : X x X -+ X and o : Y x 1. + Y are defined, and ( X , * ) ,
where y1, yz E Y . 
(4) For any y E Y , if r is randomly and uniformly chosen on Y , then y * T is uniformly (5) There are polynomial time algorithms to coiiipute laws of composition * and 0 , and distributed over Y.
to take inverses of these groups.
Then, the relation R is commutative random self-reducible, if Example 2. The following three examples E l , E2, and E3 are random self-reducible.
Among thcln, E l and E2 arc coniriiutativc ra11don: sclf-rccluciblc, bccausc tllcy arc included in Example 1. however, E3 is not cominulative raiidoui self-reducible, because commutativity of a group for the condition R4 does not hold.
E l (square roots modN).
(
A ( N , r , r ) = r 2 z mod N .
E2 (discrete logarithms).
( . = ay mod P, Y) E R(,,u),
E3 (graph isomorphism).
where G and C' are graphs, and T : G + G' and q5 : G' --+ G" are isomorphic transformations on graphs.
The following proposition is a collorary of Theorem 4 in [TW] .
Proposition 1. On inputs N and 2 , there is a pdynomial time perfect zero knowledge interactive proof that the prover can compute some y satisfying (z, y) E R N , if R satisfies the following conditions:
T O RisCRSR.
T1
There is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that, given N , d , and y', determines whether (z',y') € RN.
T2
There is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that, given N , outputs random pairs (z', y') E RN with z' uniformly distributed over damRN and y' uniformly distributed over R~f z ' ) . uniformly and randomly chosen on X. Correctness: Clearly, this construction satisfies conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) of Definition (i) ( A , B ) is a parallel version of (computational/perfect) zero knowledge interactive proof that the prover can compute some y satisfying (x, y) E R. (tr~, x) dc~iotcs thc probability space that assigns to the signature t the probability that T outputs t, on input x and m.
Theorem 2.
On inputs N and t, there is a polynomial time divertible perfect zero knowledge interactive proof for digital signatures ( A , B ) that the prover can compute some y satisfying (x, y) E R N , if the relation R is CRSR and satisfies T1 and T2'.
T2' There is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that, on input y', outputs 2' satisfying (z',y') E RN. If, in addition, y' is randomly and uniformly chosen on R N ( X N ) , then z' is uniformly distributed on d o r n H~.
Proof Sketch: Construction. On inputs N and 2 , the procedure of ( A , 8 ) is as follows. It can be proven in a manner similar to the proof of Theorem 1 that this
QED.
Note: When we replace pi by x"i (i = 1,. . . ,i!) as a part of signature information of m, we do not need to replace condition T2 by T2'.
Practical i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of divertible zero knowledge interactive proofs
Some practical protocols such as multi-key versiori and higher degree version [C3, FS, FFS, GQ, 00, Oh11 have been proposed based on a basic zero kiiowledge proof protocol for quadratic residuosity [GMR] or discrete logarithm problem.
In this section, we show that a specific class of CRSR problems, endomorphic CRSR (ECRSR) problems, has multi-keys and higher degree version divertible zero knowledge interactive proofs.
Defiiiition 4. For any N E N , let XN be a finite set, and RN E XN x XN be a relation.
R is endomorphic c o m m u t a i i u e r a n d o m self-reducible (ECRSR) if
(1) Here, using ECRSR relations, we show a protocol that is a divertible zero knowledge interactive proof with multi-keys and higher degree.
Protocol (nauki-keys a n d higher degree version diverfable zero knowledge interactive p r o o f )
On inputs N , L and 21, 22,. . . , z k , the following procedurk is repeated i = O(liU1) times. If the relation R is ECRSR, then this protocol is a polynomial time divertible perfect zero knowledge interactive proof that the prover can compute some yi satisfying (zi, yi) E R,v for all i E {I, 2, . . . , k}.
iVoies:
(1) Variations of this protocol are shown in Appendix B, which are based on the FiatShamir type protocol (Appendix A).
(2) When t = 1, k
, this protocol has not been proven to be zero knowledge, however, it has been proven to reveal no useful knowledge [FFS, 00, Ok] . (3) By combining the ideas shown in Section 3.2 and this section, we can easily construct multi-keys and higher degree version divertible perfect zero knowledge interactive proofs for digital signatures.
. Applications
In this section, the positive properties of divertible zero knowledge iriteractive prooh are shown. They can be useful for electronic checking and secret electronic balloting. In these applications, divertible zero knowledge interactive proofs for digital signatures shown in Section 3.2 are used as follows:
(1) After authority A checks the identity of member B , A gives E his digital signature on a message made by B through the zero knowledge interactive proofs between A and B. However, A cannot see his own signature or the message that he signs. That is, A makes a blind signature.
(2) B presents A's signature on B's message to a verifier C. C checks whether the message was signed by A . However, C cannot detgrmine who made the message. On the other hand, when this digital signature protocol is used for a secret ballot, A is a ballot publisher, B a voter, and C a ballot counter. After A checks the validity of B based on voter registration records, A signs (stamps) the outside of an unopened envelope that contains a ballot for B and a facing piece of carbon paper. LJ takes B's ballot with the carbon image of A's signature out of the envelope, and sends it to C. C counts it, after C checks the validity of the carbon image of the signature on the ballot. Even if A and C are in collusion with each other, they cannot know whose ballot it is. Therefore, the privacy of each voter is guaranteed.
The above check protocol and secret ballot protocol were proposed in [Cl, C2, Oh2] . However, the digital signatures used in these protocols are the RSA scheme or an RSA-like scheme. Hence, lliese protocols are riot provably secure a d are iiot eficieiit. 111 coiilrasl, when divertible zero knowledge interactive proofs for digital signatures are used for these protocols, they are provably secure under some conditions and are efficient if square root modN is adopted as a proof problem.
6. Abuses a n d the protective measiires
In this section, we turn to the negative side of divertible zero knowledge interactive proofs. We show some abuses and a number of measures to counter them.
Abuses
(1) Identification based on divertible zero knowledge interactive proofs Let us explain our abuse by using an example similar to that shown in [DGB] . &lice) identifies herself to B(ob). B impersonates A and claims to be A. Then, C(har1ie) checks the identity of E who is claiming to be A. Even if A and C are aware of the abuse, they cannot obtain any evidence but the relationship between the time when A claimed to be A and that B claimed to be A . To make it easier understand, we assume B and C are the owners of a restaurant and a jewelry shop with electronics paytnetil respectively, where customers can pay electronically. A is a customer of B's restauratit. At the inoinent that A is ready to pay and to prove her identity to B , B determines to buy an expensive thing at C's shop, and C is starting to check B's (in fact A's) identity. While C is checking the identity of B , E is checking the identity of A, where the interaction between A and B k affected by the interaction between B and C and viceversa. In this abuse, B leaves no evidence that proves the relationship between the A-B interaction and the B-C interaction.
( 2 ) Digital signatures based on divertible zero knowledge interactive proofs By using the divertible zero knowledge interactive proof, we can construct an abuse of digital signatures, as described below.
A identifies herself to B. B tries to forge A's signature on any message made by B.
Then, C checks the validity of the forged signature, which ' B is claiming, was generated by A . Even if A and C are aware of the abuse, they cannot obtain evidence of it. For illustractive purposesI consider an example similar to that in (1). B is a shop owner, and C is a banker. A is a customer of B's shop. While B is checking the identity of A , R is forging A's signature on a promissory note to C's bank written by B. Here, 5 ' s interaction with A is determined according to the promissory note. In this abuse, 5 leaves no evidence which proves the relationship between the A-B interaction and the signature message forged by B .
Protective measures
Here, we show two types of measures to protect against the above-described abuses; operational measures and algorithmic measures. Note that in the applications shown in Section 5 , oiily operational Iiieasurcs call be used 10 c o u~~~c r tticsc abuscs, bccausc algorithmic measures cannot used without losing the positive properties of divertible zero knowledge interactive proofs.
(1) Operational measures
Regarding the abuse in identification, essentially there is no operational protective measure except using a unique physical description as mentioned in [DGB] . In order to protect against the abuse in digital signatures, using a key for digital signatures different from that for identification is effective. Then, even if a forged signature message from Alice is made by Bob through the abuse described in Section 6.1, she can claim that the signature i s invalid, although it is valid with respect to her identification key.
(2) Algorithmic measures
For these divertible perfect zero knowledge interactive proofs, it is essential that a verifier can determine the values of random bits to be sent to a verifier. Therefore, there are algorithmic measures in which the values are not determined by only the verifier. Two measures are shown in the following, (i) Measure 1
In the first measure, the values of random bits to be sent froin a verifier to a prover are determined by the cooperation of the verifier and the prover. Here, the vaIues cannot be controlled by either the prover alone or the verifier alone. A coin flipping protocol for two persons has been shown in [B, BL] . In this measure, the previous perfect zero knowledge interactive proofs are used, replacing the verifier's coin flips with two people's coin flips. The other procedures in the divertible perfect zero knowledge interactive proofs are the same.
(ii) Measure 2
Recently, non-interactive zero knowledge proofs have been proposed (BFM, DMP] .
In these zero knowledge proofs, the prover and verifier share common random bits before the prover starts the proofk Therefore, these proofs are algorithmic measures to protect against this abuse, because the common random bits are not determined only by the verifier . 
Open problems

Appendix B
In this appendix, we show some protocols of divertible zero knowledge interactive proofs based on the Fiat-Shamir type (Appendix A), including the multi-keys and higher degree versions.
Protocol B1 is the Fiat-Shamir type of the protocol shown in the proof of Theorem 1 (basic version). In this protocol, we must replace condition R5 with R5' shown as follows:
R5'. There is a polynomial time algoritlini that, given N , z, and x', outputs some z* E the pru~ocol sliowii i i i Scctiuri 4 (iliulti-lwys and higher degree version). The protocol described in [DGB] as a subliminal-channelfree identification system based on the Fiat-Shamir scheme corresponds to the quadratic version of Protocol B2.
(Protocol E l ) dontRN such that (z*, y 0 r-') E R,.
Protocol 8 2 is Llie FiaL-SIimiiir l y p c
On inputs N and 2 , the following procedure is repeated t = O(lN1) times. 
